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Abstract
As a measure of performance, safety indicators are already used for many types of operations, such as in the oﬀshore oil and gas
industry. The indicators are used by operators to enhance the safety and performance of the individual plants or vessels and total
productivity of the system.
This paper reviews existing safety analyses of the oﬀshore wind industry, the onshore wind industry and oﬀshore oil and gas indus-
tries. An oﬀshore wind farm is divided into subsystems and operational phases. Safety indicators are developed for the phases and
subsystems by reviewing existing safety indicators from related industries and adapting them to the oﬀshore wind industry. The
indicators for the individual subsystems and phases are then combined to provide safety indicators for the whole wind farm over
the lifetime. Finally, the indicators are matched against incident data from the oﬀshore wind industry and an outlook for further
research and indicator validation is given.
c© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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1. Introduction
Safety indicators as a measure of performance are already in place for many types of operations. Øien et al. present
the theoretical background of safety indicators in [1] and their application in [2]. Safety indicators are widely used in
the oﬀshore oil and gas industry as presented e.g. by Skogdalen et al. [3] and Utne et al. [4]. Safety indicators are
used to enhance the safety and performance of the individual plants and total productivity of the system. This can be
achieved through proactive work preventing losses that becomes possible thanks to the indicators as stated by Pasman
et al. in [5]. The indicators are also used in political discussions to have a common framework when discussing
worker safety with unions. According to [6], indicators should be “complete, consistent, eﬀective, traceable, minimal,
continually improving and unbiased”. When looking at safety indicators the question is not about the probability of an
accident, but whether it can happen at all. Until now, indicators are used in the oﬀshore oil and gas industry, however
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no such indicators exist for the oﬀshore wind industry (OWI). According to Hopkins [7], safety indicators are only
worth developing if they can drive improvement. A large amount of the energy costs is caused by downtime and
maintenance as described by Feng et al. [8] and Scheu et al. [9]. When enhancing the performance of an OWF, it is
important not to compromise safety of the maintenance personnel. Therefore safety indicators can in fact help drive
the improvement of the performance of an oﬀshore wind farm and are hence worth developing.
In this paper, we deﬁne a safety indicator as a measurable representation of a risk inﬂuencing factor [1], where the
risk inﬂuencing factor is deﬁned as an aspect of a system or an activity that aﬀects the risk level of this system or
activity, as deﬁned by Øien [10]. The aim of this paper is to identify safety indicators for the oﬀshore wind industry
and establish a common framework for the installation and operational phase of an oﬀshore wind park. This is done
by taking a holistic approach and considering an oﬀshore wind farm (OWF) from the beginning of installation until
the decommissioning. The wind farm is divided into subsystems, according to the phase (installation, operation),
technical subsystems (substations, vessels, turbines and turbine subsystems) and operations (transport of material
and workers, turbine access, execution of maintenance actions). Existing analysis of the individual subsystems is
reviewed, taking into account analysis from other oﬀshore industries and onshore wind energy. Based on this review,
safety indicators are developed for all the subsystems. The indicators are combined to provide safety indicators for
the whole wind farm. The indicators are validated with incident data and presented in the conclusions of the paper.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview over the methodology used. The OWF with all the
subsystems is presented in Section 3. Section 4 reviews the existing analysis and presents the safety indicators for the
diﬀerent subsystems. The indicators are related to reported incident data in section 5. Finally in section 6, the paper
concludes with a presentation of the developed safety indicators and gives ideas for further research.
2. Methodology
In this paper, an OWF is analysed by dividing it into diﬀerent phases and subsystems. This is done by reviewing
existing literature on OWFs and adapting the subsystems. Subsystems of oﬀshore wind turbines are presented e.g. by
Arabian-Hoseynabadi et al. [11] and Faulstich et al. [12].
This paper further presents a review of existing analysis in the ﬁeld of health and safety in relation with the OWI.
Since few publications exists speciﬁcally on the OWI, analysis from related ﬁelds namely the oﬀshore oil and gas
industry and onshore wind industry are reviewed to cover additional perspectives on the topic.
The SINTEF report on health and safety by Tveiten et al. [13], investigates among others hazards and accident scenar-
ios for OWFs. The report on Worker Health and Safety by the Transportation Research Board [14] also investigates
hazards of working on an OWF. Two reports by the G9 Oﬀshore wind health and safety association [15,16] give an
overview of incidents and accidents on OWF and provide a breakdown of the accidents according to incident areas
and work processes.
Aneziris et al. [17] investigate hazards for onshore wind farms, reviewing also the database of the Caithness Wind-
farm Information Forum [18]. This database is regularly updated, the authors used the ﬁrst 1142 reported accidents,
accessing the database in 2012. Arabian-Hoseynabadi et al. [11] present annual failure rates and risk priority numbers
(RPN) for the individual subsystems. Faulstich et al. [12] also give annual failure rates and consider downtime per
failure for the subsystems discussed in their paper. We present the failure rates from both papers and give a compari-
son and discussion of the values.
For the analysis of oﬀshore structures in the oﬀshore oil and gas industry, we chose a paper by Skogdalen et al. [3] fo-
cusing on safety indicators for deep water drilling blowouts and a paper by Utne et al. [4] on shutdown preparedness.
To cover the external factors that inﬂuence the performance and safety of an OWF, we review the work of Dai et al.
[19] on the risk of collision between vessels and oﬀshore wind turbines. Dai et al. also identify risk reducing measures
which we present and discuss as well.
3. Description of the wind farm and its subsystems
When considering an OWF, the main stakeholder involved is the WF operator. The operator of a wind farm
(WF) is interested in maximizing the performance of the WF in order to maximize the proﬁts. Both downtime and
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Table 1. Turbine subsystems in the two papers and their equivalences
Faulstich et al. Arabian-Hoseynabadi et al.
generator generator
gearbox gearbox
mechanical break mechanical break
yaw system yaw system
hydraulic system hydraulics
rotor hub rotor and blade assembly
rotor blades
electronic control electrical control
electrical system grid and electrical system
drive train main shaft
support and housing tower, foundation and nacelle
sensors
pitch control system
maintenance are expensive, so improving the performance is vital to maximizing proﬁts. The main performance
requirement for the OWF is power production. The production of power depends on the availability and operation of
the WF subsystems like the turbine itself, substations and power cables. To monitor the performance, key performance
indicators like the energy-based availability can be used. We do not investigate the monitoring of performance in
this work. Rather we want to focus on safety indicators that enable the operator and other stakeholders (worker
unions, maintenance providers) to monitor the system and worker safety, while maximizing proﬁts with the help of
key performance indicators. The analysis of the main stakeholder and subsystems corresponds to the ﬁrst steps in a
system engineering process [20] and our analysis could be further extended using this approach. Since we want to see
the OWF through all the phases of operation, we begin with identifying the operational phases we want to investigate.
Aneziris et al. describe three diﬀerent operational phases in their paper [17]. These are “installation”, “commission”
and “maintenance/operations”. In the SINTEF report [13], Tveiten et al. chose “installation and commissioning”,
“operations”, and “maintenance” as their operational phases. To compare input from both papers, we combine the
categories “installation” and “commissioning” into one phase and choose “maintenance and operations” as second
phase.
The next part of our analysis will be the individual turbines as parts of the whole OWF. In their paper, Arabian-
Hoseynabadi et al. [11] focus on one individual turbine and identify eleven turbine subsystems, listed in Table 1. The
authors further investigate these subsystems and divide them until they reach a total of 107 parts in a wind turbine.
However, the individual parts are not reported and can hence not be used here. Still, considering the eleven subsystems
is already enough, when combined with the two diﬀerent operational phases and additional subsystems outside the
turbine. Faulstich et al. [12] identify twelve turbine subsystems as presented in Table 1. They do not divide the system
into more parts and look at failure rates for these turbine subsystems. Combining the two turbine subsystems “rotor
hub” and “rotor blades” discussed by Faulstich et al. makes it possible to compare the failure rates to those presented
by Arabian-Hoseynabadi et al.
For the analysis of the support structure of the wind turbine, we only consider general reviews of the oil and gas
industry and do not consider OWF speciﬁc structures apart from the tower mentioned above. Since oﬀshore structures
in the oil and gas industry are usually larger and have diﬀerent properties than turbine structures, these analyses will
not match the OWI exactly and review of diﬀerent OWI speciﬁc support structures, such as monopiles, jackets and
ﬂoaters should be considered for further work. Subsystems of the OWF outside the turbine include vessels, access
systems, substations, cables and organizational structures. In this paper, we focus on the collisions between vessels
and wind turbines, as considered by Dai et al. [19].
4. Safety indicators
In this section we present the safety indicators as described in existing literature. First we discuss hazards during
the life time of an OWF, separately for each operational phase. These hazards can be translated into safety indicators
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by e.g. monitoring the number of incidents due to the hazards. Next, possible failures for a single turbine and its
subsystems and indicators from related industries are reviewed. The failures in a turbine can be related to safety
indicators, since a higher failure probability will lead to more frequent repair, which in turn enhances the likelihood
of other risk factors. Finally, indicators for the risk of collision with a vessel are presented.
4.1. Hazards according to phases
The hazards according to operational phases, identiﬁed by Tveiten et al. [13] and Aneziris et al. [17] are presented
for the installation and commissioning phase in Table 2. In both phases Tveiten et al. focus mainly on properties
of the system, such as slippery surfaces, dangerous substances and failures in the organizational structure. Aneziris
et al. however, focus their hazards on the work tasks that are carried out, like mechanical or electrical work. This
diﬀerence in approach makes it diﬃcult to compare the results. However, some hazards are being identiﬁed in both
publications and named diﬀerently. Both lists recognize the danger due to the height of the turbine. This can be
measured by a safety indicator measuring the number of incidents due to the identiﬁed hazards. These are “falling
structure/load/object”, “kinetic energy” and “potential energy” in Tveiten et al. and “contact with falling, hanging or
moving objects” by Aneziris et al. The hazards concerned with marine and helicopter operations can be referenced
to the hazards concerned with moving vehicles by Aneziris et al. Safety indicators can measure again the number of
occurring incidents due to these hazards. External factors such as weather, are only considered by Tveiten et al. and
not included in the analysis by Aneziris et al. In general the analysis by Aneziris et al. is narrower than the analysis
by Tveiten et al. However, having many diﬀerent indicators about dangerous working environment or distinguishing
between diﬀerent classes of dangerous substances as in the analysis by Tveiten at al. is not practical to monitor. A
solution to this would be to group the hazards by dangerous substances together and not report the details. This leads
to one safety indicator presenting the number of incidents due to contact with (hazardous) substances. The same could
be done for external factors, like wind speed and direction, wave height and persistence or possibility of earthquakes.
It is possible to deﬁne certain thresholds for these factors, as done by Scheu et al. [9] for wave height and wind speeds,
and then only report violations of the thresholds as part of the safety analysis.
4.2. Failures in a single turbine
Reviewing the analysis of Faulstich et al. [12] and Arabian-Hoseynabadi et al. [11], we analyze a single turbine
as part of an OWF. As described, the authors consider diﬀerent subsystems for a turbine. They evaluate diﬀerent data
on the annual failure rates of turbines and conclude that the subsystems with the highest failure rates are “electrical
systems”, “electronic control” and “rotor and blade assembly”. While both papers agree on the three subsystems with
the highest failure rates, analysis diﬀers for the subsystems with lower failure rates. Since high failure rates result
in more frequent maintenance and repair actions, high failure rates increase the risk of accidents for the maintenance
personnel. In a safety analysis, the stakeholder aims to monitor and consequently improve the workers safety. Since
an improvement in the failure rates will lead to fewer repair actions and therefore increase the workers’ safety, we
suggest monitoring the failure rates as part of a safety analysis. An improvement in the turbine is most likely in the
subsystems with the highest failure rates, so for a ﬁrst safety analysis considering those three subsystems will be
suﬃcient. In further development of the safety indicators, new analyses and comparison between the existing data
should be considered to specify failure rates for all turbine subsystems and further validate the already existing failure
rates.
4.3. Safety indicators from oil and gas industry
Skogdalen et al. [3] develop safety indicators for oﬀshore oil and gas drilling. The indicators are summarized in
Figure 3 in their paper. The indicators for operational aspects, schedule and costs can be used for the OWI just as they
are for the oil and gas industries. The drilling phase in oil and gas industry can be compared with the installation phase
of the WF. When looking at the “well incidents” the indicators can no longer be used and have to be adapted to the
speciﬁc incidents that can occur in the OWI as presented in the G9 reports [15,16]. The indicators for the “operator
well response” can again be used for the OWI, by simply changing “well incident” to “turbine incident” and “well
response action” to “incident response action”. The indicators concerned with the technical condition of the safety
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critical equipment need to be adjusted to the wind farm as well. Utne et al. [4] develop twelve indicators for shutdown
preparedness in oil and gas industry. Shutdown preparedness means to schedule maintenance tasks ahead of time to
fulﬁll them during unexpected or planned shutdown of the system. This relates to the OWI such that the maintenance
has to be planned ahead and performed during weather windows that allow access to the OWF. Utne et al. consider
ﬁve qualitative indicators. The number of work orders (WO) with a low man hour estimate is an indicator for poorly
planned WOs. The same holds for the number of WOs missing location codes or short descriptions. The indicator
measuring if the needed material and spare parts are in stock also judges how well a WO is prepared. Assessing
the work scope is necessary to decide whether a maintenance job needs a shutdown to be performed. This indicator
will not be useful in the OWI, since weather windows are used instead of shutdowns and maintenance is not possible
without accessing the turbine. The indicators concerned with volume as presented in Table 1 in their paper can again
be used in the OWI. The two indicators on utilization can also be used in the OWI. They can help to see how well the
weather windows are used to perform maintenance tasks and how this impacts the future turnaround.
4.4. Collisions between vessels and turbines
Dai et al. investigate the risk of collisions between vessels and oﬀshore wind turbines [19]. They consider four
diﬀerent vessel types and seven diﬀerent collision scenarios in their analysis. The overall conclusion of the paper is
that collisions may cause structural damage to the turbines. Therefore it is important to include the risk of collisions
in any safety analysis and we take a closer look on the risk mitigating aspects presented by Dai et al. They can be
monitored and the violation of rules, crossing of thresholds or lack of monitoring can be used as safety indicators. Dai
et al. group their risk mitigating aspects into six groups. Considerations about the energy that can be absorbed during
a collision without damaging the structure are usually made during the design phase. Depending on the location of
the turbine these energies can be very low (only maintenance vessels are expected to interact) or very high (risk of
being hit by oil tankers). The presence or absence of a speciﬁc boat landing structure can also be monitored as a safety
indicator. If a structure is present, the damage to the turbine while landing a maintenance vessel is lower. “Vessel
capability” and “crew competence” are important for mitigating risk and ensuring safe operations according to Dai et
al. The capability of the crew can be measured by hours of experience or training hours. Reliability of the navigation,
propulsion and control system should be high. The safety indicators should reﬂect the risk of a possible failure. As
already stated above, the environmental conditions like sea state and wind speed need to be monitored and threshold
levels established. The number of their violations can give an additional safety indicator. In the organizational
part of the system, procedures and maintenance strategies are developed as well as contingency plans. Follow up
analysis is conducted based on the incidents reported. For monitoring this, multiple indicators can be monitored.
Procedures can be used to set the course of the vessel not directly against the turbine structure but slightly oﬀ, to
avoid collision or to establish safety zones around OWFs to prevent external vessels from crashing. The violation of
these procedures can be measured, either in absolute numbers of vessels entering the safety zone or in terms of the
number of turbine accesses per passing vessel. Even though all these indicators have the goal to prevent collisions,
Dai et al. suggest that emergency procedures should be established in order to ensure safety. The existence or the
lack of such emergency procedures and evacuation facilities should also be monitored by safety indicators. Since the
concept of safety indicators depends heavily on the reporting of incidents and accidents it is necessary to establish a
suitable reporting system for the OWF. The compliance with the system can again be measured by indicators, when
reporting the lack of incidents is requested. Dai et al. focus on turbines with monopile structures, additional analysis
of collisions between vessels and other structure types like jackets or ﬂoating turbines should be considered in future
work.
5. Indicators and incident data
This section reviews the incident data reports from the G9 Oﬀshore wind health and safety association [15,16] and
matches them to the indicators and hazards discussed before. In 2013 a total of 616 incidents was reported. This
number rose in 2014 to 994 reported incidents. However, the lost time injuries frequency, comprised of the percentage
of fatalities and lost work days in the total number of reported incidents, decreased by 34%. Therefore the authors
suggest that the reporting system has improved leading to a higher number of reported incidents. This higher number
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Table 2. Hazards during installation and commissioning
Type of hazard Tveiten et al. Aneziris et al.
Uncontrolled movement of object Falling structure/load/object Contact with falling objects from crane or load
Kinetic energy Contact with falling objects from other
Potential energy Contact with hanging or swinging objects
Contact with ﬂying object machine or tool
Contact with moving parts of a machine
Transportation Marine operations (ship collision, man overboard) Struck by moving vehicle
Helicopter operations In or on moving vehicle with loss of control
Miscellaneous Vibration (during testing)
Electrical dangers Short circuit Contact with electricity - tool
Overcharge Contact with electricity - electrical work
Electrostatic phenomena (shock, spark) Contact with electricity
Exposure to dangerous work environment Fire and/or explosion Fire - working near ﬂammables or combustibles
Radiation
Noise
Indirect eﬀects on worker health Physiological eﬀects due to heavy lifting, repeated movements, uncomfortable positions
Psychological eﬀects
Uncontrolled movement of person Work at height Fall from height - ﬁxed ladder
Slippery surfaces Fall from height - other situation
Base/ground failure Fall on same level
Exposure to dangerous material Flammable materials Fire - working near ﬂammables or combustibles
Poisonous materials
Harmful material
Oxidizing/corrosive material
Battery acid
Organizational malfunctions Insuﬃcient/missing safety equipment Trapped between
Incorrect use of machinery/tools Contact with hand held tool by self
Lack of relevant expertise
Several actors/companies involved in same operation
Time pressure
External factors Wind
Waves and currents
Lightening
Earthquake
Sabotage
Terrorism
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however does not automatically imply a decrease in worker safety. Following the same structure as for the indicators,
we ﬁrst analyze the general incidents before looking at the turbine speciﬁc incidents.
In 2013, 26% of recorded incidents were due to lifting operations including 9 incidents that lead to lost work days.
In 2014 this number decreased to 14% of the total incidents, including three lost work day incidents. Lifting operations
were not considered as an individual hazard in any of the reviewed analyses. The closest presented hazards were those
concerned with “work at height” and “falling structure/load/object” in Tveiten et al. [13] and “contact with falling
objects from crane or load/from other” and “contact with hanging or swinging objects” by Aneziris et al. [17]. In
both incident data reports, incidents that occurred while working at height are listed. For 2013 a total of 45 incidents
have been reported and for 2014 the number of reported incidents is 77. Working at heights contributes hence to just
over 7% of the reported incidents in both years. Monitoring this risk with an individual indicator thus seems practical.
Incidents due to dropping objects are listed separately in the 2014 incident data report, with a total of 93 incidents
due to dropped objects, of which none cause lost work days. However, the largest part of those dropped object
incidents occurred during lifting operations or working at heights. This supports the intuition, that during lifting parts
or working at heights is the time when dropping occurs most frequently. Having indicators in place for those cases, as
suggested by the literature, is considered to be reasonable by us. Distinguishing between diﬀerent sources of falling
objects as suggested by Aneziris et al., however, seems to be unnecessary. A distinction between work processes
during which the dropping occurs, as done in the 2014 incident data report seems more desirable. Marine operations,
with 131 reported incidents in 2013 and 237 in 2014 are accounting for more than 20% of all reported incidents in
both years. This includes maritime operations, transfer by vessels, vessel mobilization and vessel operations. Out of
these 106 and 167 incidents occurred on vessels, causing 7 lost work days in 2013 and 12 in 2014. In other words
10% of the lost work days in 2013 were caused on vessels during marine operations. This percentage rose in 2014 to
over 25%. Monitoring the health and safety of workers on vessels during marine operations therefore seems to be an
integral part of any safety analysis.
For the incidents related to speciﬁc turbine subsystems, the nacelle region accounts for 40 reported incident in
2013 and 83 in 2014. These are 6% of the reported incidents in 2013 and 8% in 2014. The nacelle region hosts most
of the subsystems of a wind turbine other than the rotor. Therefore work on any of the subsystems could lead to an
incident in the nacelle region. In 2013 four work days were lost in the nacelle region, one of them caused by manual
handling, one by operating plant and machinery and two work days by “other” work. In 2014, four work days were
lost, of which three were lost due to manual handling and one due to operating plant and machinery in the nacelle.
This analysis does not give information on the subsystem that was involved in the incident. Knowing during which
activity the incident occurred, gives information on how to prevent it. In other words, knowing the activity that causes
incidents give an operator the chance to train workers for these situations to prevent incidents from happening. In the
hub and blade area 24 incidents were reported in 2013 and 20 in 2014. These account for 4% and 2% of the reports.
In both years, one work day was lost in the hub and blade area. Even though these number are not high, we suggest to
survey the hub and blade assembly as an individual subsystem, due to its unique function within the turbine and the
resultant unique work tasks.
The incident data report from 2013 mentions a total of 15 incidents with chemicals and hazardous substances,
comprising under 3% of all incidents. In 2014 this number went down to 10 incidents (1%). This supports the pre-
viously mentioned idea to monitor several hazard categories mentioned by Tveiten et al. with one common safety
indicator. These are “ﬂammable materials”, “poisonous materials”, “harmful material”, “oxidizing material”, “cor-
rosive material”, “carcinogenic material”, “material harmful to genes” and “battery acid”. A suggested name for the
new indicator is “contact with hazardous substances”.
Categories for organizational problems or collisions are not included in the G9 incident data reports. Hence the
indicators for these cannot be validated. System safety theory advises to include human error in the analysis. Therefore
the authors suggest to keep the indicators for organizational failures in place. No collisions happened during the
incident data recording interval and therefore no such incidents are recorded. Since a collision of a ship and a turbine
has extensive consequences, monitoring the risk and possibility of such a collision seems sensible.
Two incident areas are mentioned in the data reports, where no indicators were considered in our previous analysis.
The transition piece area accounts for 32 and 53 reported yearly incidents in 2013 and 2014 respectively. These are
just over 5% of incidents, accounting for 2 lost work days in both years. Since this is the area where maintenance
personal accesses the turbine and vessels could collide with the structure, detailed monitoring of the type of work
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Table 3. List of Proposed Safety Indicators
Category Subcategory Indicator (Description) Measure
Organizational For organizational safety indicators, please see Utne et al. [4], Table 1, indicators Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, U1, U2, U3, U4, U5, V1, V2 and Skogdalen et al. [3], Figure
3, indicators for “schedule and costs”, “operational aspects” and “Operator well response”. For the indicators concerned with the well response, note that
“Time from ﬁrst indication of well incident to ﬁrst response” is substituted by “Time from ﬁrst indication of subsystem failure to ﬁrst response” and “Evaluation
of well response action” is replaced by “Evaluation of repair action/failure response action”.
Technical failure All turbine subsystems Annual failure rates for turbine subsystems (The mean number of failures per year for each turbine subsystem gives
a probability of failure).
Probability
Work Environment
and Training
Lifting The number of incidents during lifting operations (This indicator is measured as a percentage of the total num-
ber of lifting operations performed. Incidents caused by falling objects are monitored separately and are therefore
excluded.)
Percentage
Work at heights The number of incidents during work at heights. (The indicator is measured as a percentage of the total number
of work actions performed at heights. Incidents due to falling objects are excluded and monitored by a separate
indicator.)
Percentage
Falling objects The number of incidents due to the falling of an object during any operation in the WF (measured as a percentage of
the total work actions performed).
Percentage
Hub and Blade Number of incidents occurring in the Hub and Blade area of the rotor of a turbine during work actions. (The number
is given as a percentage of the total work actions in the hub and blade area and give the percentage of work at the
rotor that results in incidents.)
Percentage
Nacelle electrical Number of incidents caused by electrical work in the nacelle (measured as a percentage of all electrical work actions
undertaken).
Percentage
Nacelle mechanical Number of incidents caused by mechanical work in the nacelle (measured as a percentage of all mechanical work
actions undertaken).
Percentage
Contact with Substances Number of incidents where a worker was exposed to a hazardous substance (measured as a percentage of total number
of work actions performed in a place with possible exposure).
Percentage
Substation Number of incidents occurring in the substation (measured as percentage of the total number of work actions per-
formed in the substation).
Percentage
Transport and Traﬃc Helicopter incidents Number of incidents happening during transportation with a helicopter. (This includes material and worker trans-
portation to and from the wind farm. Given as a percentage of total transportation actions with helicopters.)
Percentage
Vessel incidents Number of incidents happening during transportation with a vessel. (This includes worker and material transportation
both to and from the wind farm and is given as a percentage of total (vessel) transportation actions.)
Percentage
Transition piece incidents Number of incidents during turbine access in the transition piece area (given as a percentage of total turbines accesses
in the TP area).
Percentage
Collisions internal Number of vessel accesses complying with the safety procedure. (Measures the risk of vessels, part of the WF,
colliding with the turbine structure or substation by measuring the number of vessel accesses complying with a
procedure, like setting the vessel course not directly at the turbine, as percentage of the total accesses to the WF.)
Percentage
Collisions external Number of safety zone violations. (The number of wind farm accesses per violation of the safety zone measures the
risk of an external vessel colliding with the turbine structure or substation.)
Percentage
Boat landing structure Presence of a boat landing structure. (A landing structure improves the energy absorbed by the structure.) Binary
External Factors Wind Number of vessel/helicopter operation in violation of wind speed thresholds (as a percentage of total number of
operations).
Percentage
Wave Number of vessel operations in violation of wave height restrictions (as a percentage of total number of vessel
operations).
Percentage
Seismic risk Peak ground acceleration factor. (This is a factor of standard gravity g providing information about the risk of
earthquakes. It can be obtained from seismic hazard maps.)
Factor
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carried out when an incident happens is suggested. Substations, both onshore and oﬀshore, including high voltage
areas and cable work caused 18 and 25 incidents, respectively. This is approximately 3% of the total reported incidents
each year. In 2013 substation work and cable areas accounted for one lost work day. In 2014 no work day was lost
in the substation area. The number of incidents is not exceptionally high in the substation area. However, due to the
unique function and properties of it, having an indicator in place for the substations is recommended. Further, due to
its unique properties, monitoring of this indicator is relatively easy.
6. Conclusion and Further Research
In this paper, we presented a review of existing literature on system and worker safety speciﬁc to the ﬁeld of oﬀshore
and onshore wind industry including some related analyses from the oﬀshore oil and gas industries. The analysis
includes both the installation and operational phase of the OWF as well as individual turbines, turbine subsystems
and the interaction with vessels. Finally, the incident data reported by G9 [15,16] was connected to the hazards
described in other publications like Tveiten et al. [13] and Aneziris at al. [17]. Most of the indicators were found to
be relevant, when compared to reported incident data. However, grouping together diﬀerent indicators concerned with
hazardous substances can facilitate the recording process and will most likely enhance the utility of the indicators.
Additional indicators for the access to the turbine and substations are recommended as well as indicators monitoring
the organizational structure and reporting system. The full list of the proposed safety indicators for the wind farm can
be found in Table 3. The table includes the categories and names of indicators, a short description and a suggestion for
measuring. For future research, additional review of other structures than monopiles is highly recommended. In a next
step, face validation by industrial partners namely WF operators should be considered. Finally, the safety indicators
have to be used in operations, data needs to be collected and the indicators need to be revised based on the collected
data. A continuous loop of adjusting the indicators based on available incident data will help improve the indicators
and can eventually lead to an improvement of the worker health and safety in an oﬀshore wind farm.
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